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VOLUME 3 NUMBER 1 1981
SHARING OF OCEAN RESOURCES - UNRESOLVED ISSUES IN
THE LAW OF THE SEA*
SHIGERU ODA**
I
Mr. Dean and distinguished members of the Faculty of the New
York Law School: it is my great honour to have been invited by your
law school to speak as the Walter M. Jeffords lecturer today. That I
have sufficient merit to be given this honour today is due in no small
measure to the legal education that I received in this country. If I were
allowed to mention only one name, it must be that of Professor Myers
S. McDougal of your Faculty. If I had not met Professor McDougal,
and pursued my studies under his guidance in New Haven between
1950 and 1953, my life would have moved in a different direction and I
would not be where I am today.
Mr. Dean and distinguished faculty members, ladies and gentle-
men: It has been thirty years since I studied international law in this
country. In these thirty years, a great deal of my work on international
law has been devoted to the Law of the Sea, and my interest has cen-
tered on the problem of the sharing of marine resources. Professor Mc-
Dougal will probably agree that he and I were among the few who pre-
*This is the text of the lecture that the author delivered at New York Law School on
September 1, 1981 as its Seventh Distinguished Walter M. Jeffords Lecturer. On that
date, the text of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Draft
Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/L.78 (1981) was not yet
available, and the achievements of the Tenth Session of the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea were unknown to the author.
The following are some of the author's works that are relevant to this lecture:
INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF SEA RESOURcES (1963); THE LAw OF THE SEA IN OuR TIME
- I: NEw DEvELoPMENTs 1966-1975 (1977); INTERNATIONAL LAw OF THE REsouRcEs OF
THE SEA (1979); The Ocean: Law and Politics, 25 NET. INT'L L. Rv. 149 (1978).
"Judge of the International Court of Justice. LL.B. University of Tokyo, 1947; LL.M.
Yale University, 1952; J.S.D. Yale University, 1953; LL.D. Tohoku University, 1962.
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dicted, as far back as the early 1950's, the future conflicts and
confusions among national interests involved in the sharing of ocean
resources. I should like to take this opportunity to discuss the question
of how ocean resources has been dealt with under international law.
My remarks will thus constitute for me, in part, a reminiscence of my
work of the past thirty years. I think that I shall also be able to
pinpoint some of the problems that face us both today, and in the fu-
ture, as regards the question of the ocean.
II
As a preliminary observation, I must recall how the ocean became
the object of the interest of the people of the world and has been made
subject to the regulations of international law.
First, for centuries past, the ocean has been used universally as a
common concourse for maritime traffic. Such use of the ocean, being in
the interest of all nations, with no one nation assailing the interest of
others by claiming its exclusive use, has led to the creation of advanced
regulations for the promotion and safe control of traffic. Subject only
to such regulations of a technical nature, the freedom of maritime traf-
fic has continued to remain the most well-established rule of interna-
tional law to be followed by nations. Since this freedom is in the com-
mon interest of all nations, and innocent passage is guaranteed in the
narrowly-limited territorial seas around the coasts, the traditional du-
alism of the high seas and the territorial seas in international law does
not have a great impact on such use of the ocean.
The second aspect of the use of the ocean relates to national secur-
ity. The ocean has been a common battleground for naval vessels of the
sovereign nations, and freedom for the maneuver of naval fleets has
undoubtedly been secure. In fact, only a handful of the great powers
remain consistently alert to this aspect, and the United States in par-
ticular was strongly concerned with it in the first and second Confer-
ences on the Law of the Sea in 1958 and 1960, when it tried by every
means to keep the territorial seas as narrow as possible in order to
ensure that the free maneuver of its naval fleet would not be hindered
by the closure of any straits of strategic importance. Both conferences,
however, failed to hit upon a uniform limit for the narrower territorial
seas. Realizing that the main interest of the developing countries lay in
the resource aspect of the ocean, and that, if the pressure of a group of
developing countries was kept up, the acceptance of a twelve-mile ter-
ritorial sea could not be avoided, the United States tried to lure the
group into accepting its narrowly-limited territorial seas policy, even
offering some substantial interest in the use of ocean resources in the
offshore areas for the benefit of the developing countries. Thus, early
in 1970, the Nixon Administration announced the belief of the United
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States Government that the time was ripe for the conclusion of a new
international treaty fixing the territorial sea at twelve miles, provided
that freedom of transit through international straits and carefully de-
fined preferential fishing rights for coastal states were also recognized.'
The aim of securing the free maneuver of naval fleets seems to have
been achieved after somewhat lengthy negotiations in UNCLOS III, as
the concept of transit passage of warships through international straits
has now been recognized in Part III of the Draft Convention on the
Law of the Sea (Informal Text) prepared last year, some articles of
which are specifically devoted to "straits used for international
navigation."2
The third aspect of the ocean, which relates to the exploitation of
marine resources, seems to be one of the greatest problems still re-
maining insufficiently discussed in UNCLOS III. Thus, I should like
today to take up this question of the Law of the Sea as seen from the
resource aspect.
III
First of all, we must bear in mind the fact that interests in the
development of resources in general are bound to bring about frequent
conflicts, so long as the world community consists of co-existing sover-
eign nations. The resources of the land covering nearly one-third of the
globe are divided among nations by land frontiers which were drawn
for various historical and political reasons. The global land resources
have never been evenly allocated among the sovereign nations; some
States are in advantageous positions, while others are not. Yet these
unevenly distributed land resources of the sovereign nations, which
have often been the cause of war in the past, are not today made the
object of redistribution. While in past colonial ages land resources in
Asia and Africa were often grabbed by colonial powers, the new con-
cept of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, as proclaimed in
the United Nations General Assembly resolution of 1962,8 can now
save these resources from exploitation by foreign powers and preserve
them for the benefit of each sovereign nation. In the field of interna-
tional law today, the exclusive control of land resources by each nation
1. Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New Strategy for Peace -A Report to
the Congress (Feb. 18, 1970), 62 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 274 (1970).
2. Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Draft Convention on the
Law of the Sea (Informal Text), arts. 34-39, 41-42, 44-45, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/WP.10/
Rev.3 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Draft Convention (Informal Text)]. The Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/L.78 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Draft Convention] is, in these arti-
cles, identical to the Draft Convention (Informal Text).
3. G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. 107, U.N. Doc. A/5344/Add. 1 (1962).
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is no longer challenged, and no one doubts that access to the land and
to its resources is exclusively reserved to each sovereign nation and re-
tained in its hands.
In contrast, the resources of the ocean, which covers two-thirds of
the globe, were long considered as common to all. Few ever doubted
that the traditional concept of freedom of the high seas would also ap-
ply to the exploitation of ocean resources. The fact was that, with re-
spect to ocean resources, the mutually conflicting and excluding inter-
ests of nations had not yet come to light before the Second World War.
The ocean was not then considered from the aspect of its resources,
except perhaps in some narrowly confined offshore areas; the science
and technology of such utilization, as well as the demand for ocean
resources, had not yet reached the stage where international regula-
tions for this purpose were necessary. If there were any legal implica-
tions relating to the exploitation of ocean resources, the extent of the
territorial sea was regarded as the sole issue, since this was deemed to
coincide with the outer limit of the exclusive use of the coastal nation's
sea resources, while the resources of the vast ocean, being infinite and
renewable, could be utilized by any nation without detriment to the
interests of others. There was, at least in the period prior to the Sec-
ond World War, no incentive to prevent free access to ocean resources.
Thus the freedom of the seas in this respect, as simply an abstract
concept, remained unchallenged, and the concept of free access re-
mained a principle in this field, with no one opposing the idea that
those who wanted, and were able, to exploit the marine resources were
free to do so.
IV
In the post-war period, the development of international law relat-
ing to ocean resources has marked something of a revolution in the
whole history of international law. Some parts of the ocean, which had
been considered if theoretically and in abstracto as free for all, now
stand under the regime of the exclusive control of each coastal State.
The concepts of the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone,
which were not' known at all under traditional international law, are
now being introduced.
Now let me begin with the concept of the continental shelf. It was
only after the Second World War that the possibility of profitably
working the petroleum resources of the continental shelf became the
subject of the attention of some nations. In 1945, the United States
claimed the submarine areas off its coasts, thus excluding access by
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other nations to offshore deposits of petroleum.' Many other coastal
States then followed suit, undoubtedly because, in so doing, they had
much to gain and nothing to lose. There was almost no resistance from
any corner of the world to countries monopolizing offshore seabed pe-
troleum in the name of the continental shelf. In those days, foreign
interests saw no loss to themselves involved in a country's working the
petroleum resources of its own offshore areas, since the exploitation of
seabed petroleum in the offshore areas of other countries was hardly
considered possible without the cooperation of those other coastal na-
tions. In other words, the exclusive use of the seabed's mineral re-
sources based on the geographically privileged position of a nation was
not considered to be detrimental to the interests of other nations.
Thus, in 1958, the Continental Shelf Convention, 5 concerned with
the distribution of seabed petroleum resources only among the respec-
tive beneficial coastal nations, was adopted without difficulty. At that
time there was no possibility of exploiting the mineral resources of the
seabed beyond the continental shelf, which was widely understood as
not extending beyond the two hundred metre isobath. The problem
was not one of law, but rather one of geography or geology, which
would not necessarily cause any conflict of national interests. If there
were any conflicts, these would result mainly from the determination of
the boundary of the continental shelf that each nation could claim.
This calm situation was broken, however, in the mid-1960's after
only two decades, when the United States oil industry began to find it
technologically possible to extract resources even from under one or
two thousand metres of water, on the continental slope. The exclusive
claims of coastal nations to the continental slope far beyond the gen-
eral two hundred-metre depth-line limit of the continental shelf would
still have been permissible in terms of the exploitability criterion in
the Continental Shelf Convention. Yet there was another interest in
the United States, represented by the hard minerals industry, which
had begun to set its sights on the exploitation of manganese nodules at
the bottom of the vast ocean. It would be contrary to their interest to
see an extension of the exclusive areas reserved for the coastal nations,
thus diminishing the areas that would otherwise have been open to
them.
In 1967, noting these conflicting interests between the oil industry
and the hard minerals industry, the Maltese delegate to the United
4. Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil
and Sea-Bed of the Continental Shelf, Proclamation No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 67 (1943-1948
Compilation), reprinted in 1 S. ODA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE OCFAN DEVELOP-
smw 341 (1976).
5. Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578,
499 U.N.T.S. 311.
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Nations took a step towards halting the gradual extension of coastal
jurisdiction for mineral resources, thus reserving the vast deep-ocean
floor for the benefit of the world in terms of the common heritage of
mankind. As was only natural, the concept of the common heritage of
mankind received wide support from a group of developing countries
which could dream of some benefits accruing to them from such a con-
cept through the avoidance of competition with the powerful developed
nations in the exploitation of the seabed, which was still far beyond
their own technical capability.
The conflict between the claim to a wider area for the exclusive
use of mineral resources for each coastal nation, and the demand to
retain as much of the vast ocean areas as possible for the benefit of the
whole world, seems to have only just been resolved by a compromise
agreement reached after the past ten years of debate in the United
Nations Seabed Committee and UNCLOS III. The Draft Convention
on the Law of the Sea which was prepared just one year ago provides
for the redefinition of the continental shelf. In contrast to the 1958
Convention, and also from the geographical concept, the definition now
suggested, containing more than five hundred words, is not easy to
grasp at first glance.7 At any rate, however, it is safe to say that practi-
cally all exploitation of offshore petroleum extending to the outer edge
of the continental margin will fall under the exclusive control of each
coastal nation.
Now let me turn to the exclusive economic zone. The history of
ocean fishing is more complicated than the case of the exploitation of
seabed mineral resources. The difference lies in the fact that the prin-
ciple of free access was believed to have existed more strongly in ocean
fishing. A claim to the extension of the coastal nations' fishery jurisdic-
tion, which would be a blow to the then-established laissez-faire policy
in ocean fishing, would invite the opposition of those nations which
would otherwise have enjoyed the freedom of fishing in such claimed
6. Draft Convention (Informal Text), supra note 2, art. 76.
7. Id. Article 76 is composed of ten sections and corresponds to article 76 in the Draft
Convention, supra note 2, and states in relevant part:
1. The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the sea-bed and subsoil
of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout
the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the con-
tinental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines
from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer
edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance.
3. The continental margin comprises the submerged prolongation of the land
mass of the coastal State, and consists of the sea-bed and subsoil of the
shelf, the slope and the rise. It does not include the deep ocean floor with
its oceanic ridges or the subsoil thereof.
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offshore areas, since the limit of the territorial seas had been regarded
as coincident with the exclusive fishing interest of the coastal States.
In this field also, the role played by the United States in the post-
war period was not insignificant, and in the United States itself there
were two opposing fishery interests, one represented by the coastal
fishing industry, particularly on the North Pacific coast, and the other
by the highly migratory tuna industry. In the post-war period, the
United States fishing industry on the North Pacific coast began to real-
ize that the three-mile territorial sea guaranteeing its exclusive interest
would probably not be sufficient to secure its profits in offshore fishing,
owing to the increasing competitive potential of the Japanese fishing
industry. Such a specific interest off the Pacific coast would have been
satisfied through bilateral negotiations with Japan, which could have
agreed to abstain from such fishing. Instead, the 1945 Proclamation of
the United States President concerning offshore fisheries8 took a step
towards expansion of fishery jurisdiction. Then it was not difficult for
any developing country, particularly in Latin America, to understand
that it would benefit simply by extending its area of coastal jurisdic-
tion, thus monopolizing the fishery income deriving therefrom or prof-
iting by the revenues of taxation imposed on foreign fishing there.
Such an expansion policy could not, however, constitute an overall na-
tional policy for the United States which, as an advanced fishing na-
tion, did not want to see the ocean diminished to the detriment of its
interest in free fishing.
At the First and Second Conferences on the Law of the Sea in
1958 and 1960, respectively, the problem of the limit of the territorial
sea was discussed in connection with the problem of the fishery zone.
Against the movement towards expansion of fishery jurisdiction, the
United States expressed its readiness to recognize the wider claim to
fishery jurisdiction only on condition that the limit of the territorial
sea be maintained as narrow as possible. The reason for this was quite
clear and, as I said at the outset, it was categorically imperative for the
United States to maintain the unhindered passage of warships through
narrow international straits, even at the sacrifice of any other interests,
particularly in fishing. In fact, the nations that wanted to keep the ju-
risdiction of each coastal State as narrow as possible from the fishery
resource aspect, so as to keep open as wide an area as possible for free
fishing, were only a handful of the nearly one hundred participating
countries in the conferences of 1958 and 1960. The views of the nations
favouring wider fishery jurisdiction were powerful, because the princi-
ple of laissez-faire, or free access, which would apply to fishing beyond
8. Policy of the United States with Respect to Coastal Fisheries in Certain Areas of
the High Seas, Proclamation No. 2668, 3 C.F.R. 68 (1943-1948 Compilation), reprinted
in 1 S. ODA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE OCEAN DEVELOPMENT 342 (1976).
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coastal jurisdiction, could benefit only those who were strong enough to
rely upon this principle. Even though, in the conferences of 1958 and
1960, extension of coastal fishery jurisdiction as such was not accepted,
no one could doubt that the trend the world was following at that time
could be deviated from no longer.
Being aware of this trend, the United States knew in the late
1960's and early 1970's that it could not but give support to the claims
to wider fishery jurisdiction in order to secure the unhindered passage
of warships through international straits. At the United Nations Sea-
bed Committee, the concept of the exclusive fishery zone and that of
the patrimonial sea were introduced respectively by Kenya in 19729
and by Mexico and a few other Caribbean countries in 1973.1" No one
could divert this trend of expansion of the exclusive interest of the
coastal States aimed at enjoyment of the fishing resources in offshore
areas. The only possibility was to attempt to mitigate the exclusiveness
claimed by the coastal States by imposing some restrictions on their
competence.
Thus, Part V of the Draft Convention of the Law of the Sea (In-
formal Text) of 22 September 1980 comprising twenty-one articles,
provides for a new regime of the exclusive economic zone." Certainly
the exclusive economic zone as defined in the Draft Convention is dif-
ferent from a simple expansion of the territorial sea, in that some re-
strictions are imposed on the competence of the coastal States. There
are still many ambiguities left in this concept, but no one today doubts
that fishing in the exclusive economic zone falls within the exclusive
interest of the coastal States. Whatever the outcome of UNCLOS III in
the years to come, there does not remain any doubt that the concept of
the exclusive economic zone has its firm position in customary interna-
tional law.
What I have been talking about concerning the continental shelf
and the exclusive economic zone may be summarized as follows: in the
offshore areas now, which, just like the land areas, cover approximately
one-third of the globe, exclusive control of resoures has been estab-
lished through UNCLOS III in favour of the geographically-privileged
nations, in terms of the redefined continental shelf for mineral re-
sources and the exclusive economic zone for fishery resources. Such de-
velopment in the past three-and-a-half decades has completely
9. U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.10 (1972).
10. U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.21 (1973) (submitted by Colombia, Mexico and
Venezuela).
11. Draft Convention (Informal Text), supra note 2, arts. 55-75. These articles corre-
spond to articles 55-75 in the Draft Convention, supra note 2, with some modifications in




changed the meaning of the ocean as interpreted under traditional in-
ternational law. And I have no doubt that the concept of permanent
sovereignty over natural resources, which has already been established
for land resources, will eventually apply to those marine resources
which fall under the exclusive control of each coastal State.
V
There still remains another half of the ocean, covering one-third of
the globe, that is not placed within the exclusive control of each coastal
nation. The problem that faces us now and in the future relates to how
the marine resources in this remaining half of the ocean should be
treated under international law. These resources are mineral resources
beyond the outer limit of the continental shelf, and fishery resources
beyond the exclusive economic zone.
With regard to the mineral resources in the seabed of the vast
ocean beyond the limit of the continental shelf, the concept of the
common heritage of mankind is now being suggested. Taking an initia-
tive in this direction, for the first time at the United Nations General
Assembly, the delegate of Malta, in 1967, considered that the time had
come to declare this area to be the common heritage of mankind and
proposed that immediate steps should be taken to draft a treaty for
such a purpose.1' After three years of deliberations at the United Na-
tions Seabed Committee, the United Nations General Assembly de-
clared in 1970 that this area and the resources of the area were the
common heritage of mankind, and that all activities regarding the ex-
ploitation of these resources should be governed by an international
regime to be established in the future."1
The deliberations and negotiations continued for ten years, and
UNCLOS III has now produced a set of very detailed provisions on
this question in the Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea (Informal
Text), prepared last year. Fifty-nine articles in Part XI concerning this
area, twenty-two articles in Annex III on Basic Conditions of Prospect-
ing, Exploration and Exploitation and thirteen articles in Annex IV on
Statute of the Enterprise, are devoted to the exploitation of this area
and its mineral resources, which are defined as the common heritage of
mankind.
Yet for the past few years, UNCLOS III has run onto the rocks.
The main problems still remaining to be solved at future sessions are
the composition of the Council of International Seabed Authority,
which is to have decisive competence in the exploitation of this area,
12. 22 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/6695 (1967). See also 22 U.N. GAOR C.1 (1515
mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/C.1/P.V.1515 (1967).
13. G.A. Res. 2749, 25 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/544 (1970).
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and the participation of private enterprises in parallel with direct ex-
ploitation by international enterprises. It is reported that the United
States blocked UNCLOS III early this year, mainly because the Rea-
gan Administration was not yet in a position to determine its own pol-
icy towards this particular problem. This reflects the dissatisfaction
felt by the hard-mineral industries of the United States, with the ways
and means of exploitation suggested in the Draft Convention.
Now I will turn to ocean fishing. Here the concept of the common
heritage of mankind has not been suggested in any formal forum of the
United Nations, because it has traditionally been considered that the
freedom of fishing has existed. But I submit that the real and difficult
problems of fishing have not been touched upon in past discussions at
UNCLOS III and are now left for future discussions.
Suggestions were often made at the early stages of UNCLOS III to
drop fishing from the list of the freedoms of the high seas. The Draft
Convention on the Law of the Sea (Informal Text) does mention as one
of the six freedoms of the high seas that of fishing, but subject to cer-
tain conditions concerning management and conservation of the living
resources of the high seas." It suggests the cooperation of States in the
management and conservation of living resources, but without men-
tioning any concrete substance of management.15 I submit that the
drafting of the provisions concerning high seas fisheries is very impre-
cise: the duty for cooperation seems rather abstract and there is no
provision referring to how international cooperation in the manage-
ment and conservation of high seas fishery resources can be carried out
in a concrete way. Considering this problem of the management and
conservation of high seas fisheries, it will perhaps be as well to reflect
for a moment on the history of high seas during the past decades.
In the post-war period, the necessity of joint conservation mea-
sures had come to be widely recognized for certain species of living
resources, and this has never been contested by any nation. The princi-
ple of free competition among States, however, obtains only where de-
mands upon resources do not overwhelmingly exceed the amount of
allowable catch, and conservation measures take the form of restric-
tions on permissible fishing gear, fishing seasons, or fishing areas. If a
fundamental change in circumstances should occur, each State will un-
doubtedly be inclined to minimize its own sacrifice and to maximize its
14. Draft Convention (Informal Text), supra note 2, art. 16, which now corresponds
to article 116 in the Draft Convention, supra note 2, provides: "All States have the right
for their nationals to engage in fishing on the high seas subject to: (a) Their treaty obli-
gation; (b) The rights and duties as well as the interests of coastal States. .. "
15. Draft Convention (Informal Text), supra note 2, art. 117, which corresponds to
article 117 in the Draft Convention, supra note 2, provides: "All States have the duty to
take, or to cooperate with other States in taking, such measures for their respective na-
tionals as may be necessary for the conservation of the living resources of the high seas"
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own share of resources quite independently of any reasoning in favour
of preferential distribution of resources.
This problem may best be illustrated by a simple example. If the
total possible catch of a certain species is one hundred and fifty, and
prudent conservation practice demands that the total allowable catch
be only one hundred, the burden of abstaining from harvesting the ad-
ditional fifty will have to be imposed in some way upon the States con-
cerned in exploiting the available one hundred. Each State may, of
course, freely compete in fishing within the total allowable catch of one
hundred. Free competition, however, does not satisfy States which so
substantially preempt the fisheries concerned that fishing by any new-
comer will necessarily decrease their own catch, nor will it be accept-
able to nations with less advanced technologies and economies.
In such cases, conflict will inevitably occur between two parties
who might otherwise agree upon the desirability of conservation of
marine living resources. One will adhere to traditional arguments of
free competition in fishing on the high seas, especially since its own
technology and economy can bring it a larger share of resources, while
the other, seeking to assure itself of a constant, preferably large, share
of the resources, might invoke all kinds of reasoning in an attempt to
keep its competitors from exploiting the areas it considers most impor-
tant. The problems inherent in the allocation of limitations have in
fact made it difficult to reconcile conflicting national interests even
among those States that are most vitally concerned with the conserva-
tion of resources.
The case of Antarctic whaling may offer an interesting example of
the allocation of marine living resources among the various States.
Antarctic whaling had been open to those countries which, under the
1946 Whaling Convention, were able to compete freely for their maxi-
mum share within the total limit set by the International Whaling
Commission.' 6 Several countries, all of which were advanced nations,
were engaged in Antarctic whaling in expeditions known as the "whal-
ing olympic." These activities had been generally regarded as typical of
exploitation respecting conservation requirements on an international
level. Towards the end of the 1960's, however, it had become increas-
ingly difficult to maintain a system of free competition. The allocation
of quotas among the States concerned, based simply on the result of
negotiations each year, has become the practice in Antarctic whaling,
replacing the "whaling olympic."
The decline of the laissez-faire policy which had been maintained
in ocean fishing, even potentially, during past centuries, coincides with
the growing concept of the common heritage of mankind suggested for
16. For a discussion of the regulations regarding Antarctic whaling, see S. ODA, IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW OF THE RESOURCES OF THE SEA 51 (1979).
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the mineral resources of the deep ocean floor. Certainly in the case of
ocean fishing, the problems are different from those encountered in
seabed development, as some nations may claim that they already pos-
sess certain fishing rights in the vast ocean, acquired on the basis of
longstanding fishing operations. Yet these advanced nations are very
limited in number. I think that discussions will eventually be held on
the new concept of the common heritage of mankind applicable to
ocean fishing similar to those discussions centered on seabed mineral
resources in UNCLOS III.
VI
I cannot conclude my talk without referring very briefly to a fur-
ther difficult problem relating to the future Law of the Sea, which rep-
resents another aspect of the development of ocean resources. That is
the issue of protection of the marine environment. With regard to
marine pollution, the Law of the Sea, like environmental issues in gen-
eral, is facing the basic problem of "development versus protection of
the environment." One of my friends said at UNCLOS III: "Poor pol-
lution, no one is in your favour." There are always pros and cons to the
various topics at UNCLOS III, but certainly no one has ever been in
favour of marine pollution. If disposal of waste or discharge of pollu-
tants into the sea were to be completely prohibited, the problem would
then be much simpler - at least, for those unconcerned with land pollu-
tion. The disposal of some waste, and the discharge of some pollutants
as a result of economic development are, however, unavoidable. In fact,
the sea becomes ever more attractive to any nation or to any industry
for this purpose. If we were to completely prohibit this activity, we
would have to run down a great deal of industrial and social progress,
and the cost would be extremely high. The shipping industry too,
would labour under an immense and costly handicap.
Thus, although no one ever doubts the necessity of environmental
protection of the ocean, stringent environmental control could raise op-
position from industry. A balance must be struck between the two op-
posite policies, namely the encouragement of economic development
and the protection of the marine environment. In addition, a further
consideration is how to spread the burden between the different na-
tions: the burden of sacrificing economic development for the protec-
tion of the marine environment. We find ourselves confronted by maxi-
mum levels of pollution, and the concomitant necessity that we
consider how to parcel out restrictions on industry to prevent further
pollution. Aside from the question of whether the parcelling should be
done by industry or by nation, it is noteworthy that among the devel-
oping nations there are those for whom "development" takes prece-
dence over "environment." While saddling the developed countries
[Vol. 3
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with the burden of preventing marine pollution, they expect to con-
tinue developing as they see fit, free from all restrictions. Some years
ago I predicted that the concept of the common heritage of mankind
would also be introduced in this respect, and said that this might be-
come one of the topics to be discussed at any future conference on the
Law of the Sea. Here again the Law of the Sea may eventually face
problems related to how to allocate sacrifices imposed in environmen-
tal protection as each nation, in its relationship with other countries,
tries to minimize the burden on its industry necessitated by pollution
control, even while recognizing the existence of overall limits.
VII
I now come to the conclusion, or rather, I now come to the point
where I must pose questions. On the one hand, the question of exclu-
sive use being reserved to each coastal nation has now become defined
in terms of either the concept of the redefined continental shelf or that
of the exclusive economic zone. On the other hand, in the areas be-
yond, the concept of the common heritage of mankind has been intro-
duced for the exploitation of their mineral resources, and in the future,
almost without doubt, this concept will also apply to fishery resources
or even to protection of the marine environment. What really faces us
today is, first, how to distribute and allocate the limited amount of
ocean resources, mineral or living, among the sovereign nations, each of
which will, naturally, try to maximize its own share. Second, how to
distribute and allocate among the sovereign nations the sacrifices - and
again each nation will, naturally, try to minimize its own sacrifice -
involved in protection of the marine environment necessitated by eco-
nomic development.
Does simply suggesting the concept of the common heritage of
mankind provide us with any solution? What does the phrase "com-
mon heritage of mankind" really mean? What is the substance behind
this expression? I am not in a position to comment on what the legal
implications the 1970 United Nations General Assembly resolution
might have. The declaration does not necessarily specify by whom and
how the deep ocean floor could be developed, nor by whom and how
the benefits would be shared. The substance of the "common heritage
of mankind" involves various interpretations. The idea of liberty as
distinct from license has always implied certain checks and balances.
If, however, this idea of freedom is to be denied and replaced by some
new idea of justice, then new principles must be worked out. The mere
words "common heritage of mankind" are pious, but empty. To simply
formulate some machinery is also useless. As the issues discussed at
UNCLOS III are related to the areas which are considered those of the
common heritage of mankind, the interests of land-resource-possessing
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and non-possessing countries are so conflicting as to raise the spectre
of bloody confrontations.
What kind of idea in principle can we obtain if we are to put sub-
stance into the conceptual expression "common heritage of mankind"?
If we consider the complexities of national interests that are still
strongly projected onto the common heritage, then it can be said that
international society has not yet developed to such a high level of re-
sponsibility or harmony that we can talk with common understanding
of the "common heritage of mankind." People today appear to be sat-
isfied with the mere, somewhat beautiful-sounding, words. As I stated
at the outset, land resources are unevenly divided among the sovereign
nations, developed or developing, and offshore resources are reserved
only for the benefit of the geographically-privileged coastal nations.
Considering this, the problem of how to implement the concept of the
common heritage of mankind with regard to sharing the benefits of the
vast ocean resources, and sharing the sacrifices or burdens of economic
development for the protection of the vast ocean, must be seen as a
dominant problem which it is urgent to face and solve.
I have not given any solution, nor even a hint of any solution, to
these difficult problems of resource-sharing and burden-sharing. I in-
tend only to suggest that we should go beyond a simple playing with
the beautiful catchphrase, "common heritage of mankind." To do so
will require close examination by not only international lawyers, but
also economists, political scientists, and even philosophers, who are
concerned with the future fate of the world community. That examina-
tion will be necessary, moreover, not for the sole sake of the Law of the
Sea, but in order to put real backbone into the New International Eco-
nomic Order, a concept that is now gaining ground in every corner of
the world, and which likewise must not be allowed to remain a mere
shibboleth.
Mr. Dean, distinguished members of the Faculty, ladies and gen-
tlemen, allow me once more to thank you sincerely for the honour you
have done me and for lending me your kind attention.
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